Australians have parked $349 billion in mortgage offset accounts on a simple promise: keep your savings here and the bank will charge you less interest. A borrower with a $600,000 loan and $100,000 in an offset pays interest on only $500,000. Over the life of a loan, the savings can run into tens of thousands of dollars. Many borrowers pay extra for the privilege, through fees or a higher rate. For some, the bank didn’t keep its side of the bargain, and didn’t notice. The regulator did notice, but just won’t tell you which bank.
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s review of the problem makes for uncomfortable reading. Banks paid more than $55 million in compensation for offset account failures between September 2023 and August 2025, and more than $10 million since. The true figure is likely higher. More striking still is how many of those failures the banks missed until the regulator went looking.
ASIC examined eight banks covering more than 70 per cent of the home loan market: AMP, ANZ, the Commonwealth Bank, Credit Union Australia, HSBC, ING, Macquarie, and Westpac. It found weaknesses in how every one of them set up, monitored, and managed offset accounts. Not some of them. All eight. The most common problems were hardly sophisticated: accounts opened but never linked to the loan, accounts never opened at all, or links broken when customers refinanced or switched products. Much of it came down to manual processes, at some of the biggest financial institutions in the country.
The detection record is worse. Banks failed to identify 77 per cent of the reported offset failures before ASIC asked for the data, and one bank accounted for most of those undetected cases. ASIC published the names of all eight banks it reviewed but declined to say which one that was.
Then there is the case study ASIC chose to highlight. When responding to the regulator’s data request, one bank found hundreds of loans where the offset account had not been created or linked. The gaps were not news to it. An earlier internal review had already warned of serious problems in how offsets were being set up and managed. Despite knowing this, the bank took no steps to identify or compensate affected customers until ASIC became involved. It is now paying more than $1.4 million in compensation through a remediation program reviewing loans dating back to 2019. That bank is not named either.
This matters because offset failures are close to invisible. Monthly repayments usually stay the same. The extra interest is quietly added to the loan balance, extending the term and increasing the total cost. Customers who thought they were chipping away at their debt were in some cases doing no such thing. One bank told ASIC that unless a customer complained, it had no routine process to compensate them for its own mistakes. Put another way: the mistake was the bank’s, but the job of noticing it, and asking for your money back, was yours.
The banks’ defence is that these are isolated errors. The Australian Banking Association has said that in more than 99 per cent of cases, banks were found to manage offsets correctly. We are not told how that figure was arrived at. But in the loans ASIC examined, the banks’ own reporting turned up only a low volume of failures, even though five of them ran offset-related remediation programs during or after the review period and banks were paying compensation on a high volume of complaints. A reassuring statistic is only as good as the counting behind it, and counting is not where the banks shone.
ASIC’s likely answer is that this was a supervisory review, not an enforcement action, and that naming a bank without a formal finding of wrongdoing would be unfair. But ASIC has already named all eight banks it examined. What it has withheld is the single detail that would actually help customers: which one was responsible for most of the failures that went undetected. Fairness to the bank, it seems and in my opinion, outranks usefulness to its customers.
ASIC staff are public servants. Their job is to serve the public, not to protect the reputation of a bank that failed its customers. It is my view that naming the bank would have given its customers good reason to check their accounts with particular care. Withholding the name leaves them relying on the institution that missed the problem to tell them whether they have been paying unnecessary interest for months or years.
The Senate Economics References Committee is now inquiring into mortgage offset accounts. It should press ASIC on this point. Why does the public interest require the bank’s identity to remain confidential? What principle is served by leaving the customers of that institution less informed than they could be? ASIC’s chair, Sarah Court, said in July that this was ‘not an enforcement issue at the moment’. The committee might ask her what, exactly, a bank must do to become one. Knowing of serious failings and sitting on them until the regulator knocks apparently isn’t enough.
Offset accounts are not a niche product. They are used by close to two million households, many of them trying to pay off a home loan faster. When the product fails, the cost falls on the people least able to detect it. Banks have an obvious responsibility to get the basic linking and monitoring right. Regulators have a responsibility to be transparent when those systems fail at scale.
The compensation already paid shows that the failures were not trivial. ASIC tells borrowers to check their offset accounts are working. Sound advice. It would be sounder still if ASIC told them which bank’s accounts most needed checking.
Chris Cornish is an independent financial planner and finance commentator.


















