Defence is not a game. Our geopolitical advantages are not trivial election pieces to be moved around the board. And never, in Australian history, have we had a demographic of politicians and citizens less interested in the cold facts of war.
This is not a piece about the Greens’ suicidal defence approach that views communist China as a huggable panda.
It is an expression of frustration over a footnote in this week’s announcement about Australia’s strengthening engagement with India.
Amidst Modi’s stadium welcome in Victoria and Labor’s red-carpet events, a detail has been overlooked. Journalists saw the word space, shrugged, and flipped the page.
Australian tracking terminal commissioned for India’s historic human spaceflight program…
Space is interchangeable with defence.
The US Administration isn’t interested in Elon Musk because a geek wants to go to Mars. SpaceX holds billions in defence and intelligence contracts. The company has been commissioned to create a satellite communications backbone for military sensors and weapons platforms. Musk’s company holds contracts with the Pentagon for classified space technology. Starlink’s cousin, Starshield, is the next generation of global military-dedicated communication. The commercial world has stepped in to fix lagging government technology.
When the suggestion was floated that Elon Musk might be invited to set up SpaceX investment on a northern Australian island … it was not some offhand left-field gift to a Mars-obsessed billionaire. It was a question about Australia’s (lack of) space-based military advancement.
While parliamentarians are bickering over submarines that may never arrive, the next war will be waged from command centres in the sky.
Australia has fallen behind. Our most recent attempt to launch a rocket ended up face-down in the dirt.
Suffice to say, we need help.
Who we accept that help from, and what sort of military infrastructure we lay down, could determine Australia’s survival as a sovereign entity in a fast-approaching Pacific war.
When dealing with military assets of this magnitude, Australia has to be absolutely sure that our agreements are unbreakable. It is why the West has traditionally formed alliances with itself.
Commercial trade relations that remain firm in peacetime are not necessarily safe when tested in complex warfare where ethnic, historic, and personal problems are magnified by opportunism, vengeance, and expansionism.
It is the nation-state equivalent of domestic violence where a loving couple end up throwing blows over an argument they can’t remember.
The existence of a Pacific war, and Australia’s participation in it, is beyond our control.
The CCP has made military prowess central to its domestic struggles and begun painting targets on our Pacific neighbours. Whether they’re covering coral atolls in concrete to build outposts in contested waters, or delivering inflammatory speeches about Taiwan while overlooking weapons parades, we have seen this behaviour before. With the balance of power at the United Nations under Chinese influence, it is possible we will see the resurgence of actual power redrawing map lines.
America, China, Russia, India, and the European Union are acting upon this assumption.
Australia lacks the capability, under its present political management, to position itself for offence.
There is little choice but to position ourselves as a strategic defensive piece flanked by other nations who provide the bulk of hardware support. This is not ideal. It is reality.
We have geographic strategic prominence. Our extended territories, especially our island chains and Antarctic territory, are immensely valuable and under constant threat from foreign powers. Many of our remote assets remain within Australian control purely on the threat of American retaliation or their active military presence.
Australia can rely on America because they require us for their own defence. That is a powerful foundation for a military bond.
Constructing additional Australian infrastructure to defend or utilise undeveloped assets is a cost nightmare. We prioritise environmental activism, Indigenous payouts, and union considerations over the creation of the asset, unlike China and India.
Any infrastructure that is built to enable the defence of, say, an island, equally opens up military offence from more powerful nations.
Put a runway on an island and anyone can land there. Build a harbour, all the ships can make port. Assets have to be defensible if they are developed.
Australia already made a severe strategic mistake viewing the Port of Darwin as an economic, rather than military, asset. Neither the former nor current Prime Minister has the balls to fix it.
The Labor government may be in the opening phase of another, even larger error.
It depends on whether they understand the discussion below and what, if anything, they are withholding from the public.
The Cocos (Keeling) Islands
Three-thousand kilometres northwest of Perth, in the Indian Ocean, beneath West Sumatra and near(ish) the Christmas Islands, sits Australia’s remote territory of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands.
Comprised of two atolls with 27 coral islands, its major West Island and Home Island support around 600 people, including tourists.
Its history of Australian ownership is complex, but for present strategic purposes it is inhabited by a majority population of Sunni Islam-practicing, bi-lingual, Cocos Malays who fall under the administrative responsibility (and mostly law) of Western Australia.
The islands were discovered, uninhabited, in 1609 by the British sea captain, William Keeling, while returning from Java on the Red Dragon.
The English merchant/adventurer Alexander Hare (1826) and John Clunies-Ross (1827) settled on the island with groups of workers brought in to manage copra plantations. More workers continued to arrive over the years. As a people, they now have diasporas in Western Australia.
The Clunies-Ross family sold the islands to Australia in 1978 and Home Island, specifically, in 1993. It was a descendant of Clunies-Ross that led an unsuccessful independence campaign in 1984 but only after the United Nations kicked up a fuss in 1974. In the end, only 9 out of 259 voted for independence.
The Islands’ pre-war history includes a visit from Charles Darwin aboard the HMS Beagle in 1836 and a period where Clunies-Ross approached two governments, the British and Dutch, regarding a possible annexation of the islands. Neither showed any interest before his death in 1854.
It was under the governance of his son that the British officially incorporated the islands as part of their territory and in 1886 they were given in perpetuity to his family.
And then it gets complicated, with administrative control moving from the British, to the Colony of Singapore (under the United Kingdom), and then to Australia. This is despite still being effectively governed by the Clunies-Ross family who styled themselves as King of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands.
Australia ended up in possession of a unique and critical piece of the map. Had anyone possessed a crystal ball to foresee the coming world wars, we would never have been allowed to keep the Cocos (Keeling) Islands.
They are rare, precious, remarkable, and in constant peril from overt and subversive conquest.
Australia’s Antarctic Territories are a comparable strategic situation where science and research are being misused by China to excuse sovereignty violations and allow for the construction of otherwise-prohibited military-capable facilities nearby. We also have very little ability to police environmental violations, let alone a genuine hostile incursion. In other words, a mixture of American might and paper treaties holds our borders and little else.
A similar situation faces the Cocos Islands, which is why its people often express unease when military assets are developed. They worry it will attract unwanted attention.
Climate Change and a relocation project?
As far as the Australian government is concerned, maintaining domestic support for Australia is not only the right thing to do, it is a sensible defence strategy. Enticing the UN to come knocking with another referendum or leaving the door open to other nations that more closely align ethnically and religiously presents a risk to home defence.
Which is why it was strange to watch a rather bizarre climate-induced debate taking place. The threat of ‘rising sea levels’ in the next half-century was used to suggest the Cocos people might need to be re-located, leaving the islands as a military outpost.
The Cocos community expressed concern about this future, considering something similar happened with Diego Garcia.
No one is saying the Cocos Islands are environmentally stable. With no rock, the islands are comprised of sand and coral which rises no more than three metres above sea level. Ocean swells and storms cause significant damage to residential areas. The local council has long complained about Australia dragging its feet or making funding difficult for urgent sand-bagging and other urgent infrastructure. A draft Coastal Hazard Risk Management and Adaptation Plan was presented in 2021 and somewhere in the timeline up to 2025, a full relocation of residents was suggested.
As residents correctly asked, why spend half-a-billion on a runway if the islands will be gone soon?
The Shire of Cocos (Keeling) Island Chief Executive called it the ‘worst thing that the Commonwealth has ever delivered here’ adding it was ‘pretty much a blueprint for the Commonwealth to get rid of the Home Islanders from the Cocos (Keeling) Islands’.
This has all been walked back.
Australia now appears committed to turning the Cocos Islands into a high-level military outpost.
But why?
Why is this small circle of coral so important?
And why is it rarely talked about in Canberra?
The Cocos Islands are not in the middle of nowhere. They are close to critical Indian Ocean shipping lanes and the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits. Should any Pacific conflict break out, this position would be critical for tracking, monitoring, and controlling major chokepoints and supply lines. This includes China’s Middle Eastern oil shipments.
Australia must retain freedom of navigation in this part of the Indian Ocean and therefore, have a way to defend our ships.
The military history of the Cocos Islands
On November 9, 1914, the Cocos Islands became the theatre of Australia’s ‘first single-ship battle at sea’ when the HMAS Sydney and SMS Emden (Germany) engaged.
The SMS Emden was sinking steamers and warships. Insurance rates were climbing. And war assets were unable to move from Australia to Europe. Then the SMS Emden’s captain decided to attack the cable and wireless station on the Cocos Islands which enabled communication between Australia and England. Long story short, Australia won and the SMS Emden ended up wrecked. The incident proved the critical position of the islands for communications. The wreck is gone, but one of the Emden’s is on display in Hyde Park, Sydney.
The islands continued to remain important for communications in the second world war. It was during this time that Allied forces built the islands’ original airstrip (1944). In May of 1942, Sir Lankan soldiers from the Ceylon Defence Force tried to mutiny against British officers, but failed. The Fall of Singapore had a significant impact on the ability of Allied forces to maintain control of the region and defend Australia’s northern territories. The relationship between Ceylon and Japan improved. Suddenly, friendships shifted. The hope of the Ceylonese was that the Japanese could facilitate their fight for independence. And so, for the soldiers stationed on the Cocos Islands, their allegiance changed. The plan was to disarm the British, claim the Cocos Islands for Japan, and signal to the Japanese stationed on Christmas Island (which had been occupied since March 1942).
Where does this leave the Cocos (Keeling) Islands in modern warfare?
The Australian Defence Force has already spent well over $500 million in 2023 upgrading the airstrip to allow P-8A Poseidon aircraft (which engage in anti-submarine warfare along with surveillance).
Objections to the military upgrades quietened when it brought much-needed economic security to residents.
The US were keen to incorporate the islands as part of their Pacific Deterrence Initiative. This would include the Cocos Islands, Timor Leste, PNG, and the Philippines. At the time, the ADF noted an increase in Chinese submarine activity in the valuable waters.
A spokesman for the US Navy’s Pacific Fleet engineering arm said: ‘These projects may or may not support the Darwin Marines Rotational Force.’
Keeping in mind, the US holds military assets and personnel in Darwin assisting Australia’s ability to defend the north.
Militarising the islands is considered a critical deterrence strategy against Chinese aggression. The ability to cut off a portion of China’s oil by controlling these waters is the best bloodless way to protect Taiwan and Australia.
As a security scholar at the ANU said: ‘Chinese naval vessels would effectively be trapped in the Indian Ocean and … they would have little or no air support, because there are no bases or facilities of its own that [China] could rely on.’
In other words, China’s war machine might dwarf Australia, but it has vulnerabilities that Australia can exploit for the protection of the Pacific.
The capture of oil tankers in war is the highest prize imaginable for a nation like ours, now dependent on our geopolitical aggressor for fuel. The threat of doing so could even be used to guarantee our supply contracts during minor unrest.
On that point, it has been to China’s advantage to isolate Russia from the rest of the world and become its major oil trade partner. The overland routes are easier to defend.
And while China’s Belt and Road Initiative has expanded Beijing’s military reach through many of the first and second world war’s former geographic positions, it has not been able to reliably control the Indian Ocean.
However, Australian flirtations with America regarding the Cocos (Keeling) Islands have gone quiet. At least, publicly.
In steps India and Albanese
America might be the most reliable and trustworthy military partner we have, but they are problematic for Labor. The Greens are in open revolt against them and instead of educating the public on the realities of life and war, it could be that they have chosen a more diverse and multicultural solution.
This is not to say it is the right thing to do for our nation’s defence, only that it presents a short-term gain for Labor in the polls and what feels like a way to develop military defence without the Greens breathing down their necks about imperialist powers.
We know India is hyper-fixated on the Cocos Islands as a military asset. The Indian Navy and Air Force visited in 2023 and have been involved in collaborative projects already.
There is a formal Memorandum of Understanding between the Satcom Industry Association-India and the Space Industry Association of Australia to ‘deepen collaboration and drive mutual growth in the space industry’ signed at DefSAT 2024.
The framing includes military integration and strategic influence over the Pacific.
And then we have the announcement that appeared as a footnote: Australian tracking terminal commissioned for India’s historic spaceflight program.
Not ours. India’s.
Their national campaign slogan is ‘Grow More, Achieve More’.
This expanding India’s Gaganyaan Human Spaceflight Program includes moving into sensitive Australian territory with the construction of the tracking facility on the Cocos (Keeling) Islands.
The Australian Space Agency is leading Australia’s contribution, working with other government agencies and Australian defence and space company Nova Systems to establish temporary telemetry terminals on the Cocos (Keeling) Islands to track the four Gaganyaan missions.
To start with, anyway.
The Minister for Regional Development, Local government, and Territories of Australia framed it firmly in realm of space by saying, ‘…the islands are contributing to a global effort that advances human exploration and strengthens Australia’s position as a trusted partner in space collaboration.’
Most of the announcements from government and industry voices read like this. Very few opened the discussion around allowing a foreign nation to have a measure of military-significant technology on a difficult-to-defend remote territory.
None of this is to suggest joint space telemetry technology is wrong or unwise, only that these projects are happening in the atmosphere or regional uncertainty with further considerations.
The Head of the Australian Space Agency said:
‘Our unmatched geographic advantages make Australia a desirable partner for space launches and returns – with our wide-open ranges, coastlines, and access to targeted orbits – but also for critical space tracking capability, thanks to our distinctive and clear view of the sky.’
The article in the Australian Space Agency adds:
‘Australia and India are also exploring potential cooperation on search and rescue operations for controlled landings in waters off Western Australia, expanding the partnership beyond launch tracking to broader mission support.’
There is very good coverage of the regional plan in The Strategist which states, ‘… Australia and India remain focused on developing their defence partnership in new areas, including working with each other to build maritime domain awareness in the Indian Ocean. This task will require working with partners around the region to govern shared maritime spaces.’
Where is the risk?
There are obvious benefits with the above, but I would add a warning. Or if you do not like warnings, call them thoughts.
Is Anthony Albanese and the rest of Parliament capable of high-level defence strategy during an active Pacific conflict that might reach all the way into Russia?
There are already concerns about increasing over-reliance on China for critical systems and trade … are we creating a similar weak point with India?
Do we trust India implicitly with Australia’s military defence?
That is not to say they’re not our geopolitical allies, but what they do have is a war-forged relationship with Russia that is unbreakable. And Russia is China’s closest ally. This ring of power creates an obvious conflict when push comes to literal shove.
Where are the stress points of this alliance?
The following scenario is entirely possible: China starts a Pacific war for Taiwan. China obtains support from its tight ally, Russia. Russia uses its unbreakable friendship and trade relationship with India to pressure India to withholding support for Australia or worse, denying us access to shared technology leaving us blind. Even non-violent responses like this reveal real risk in these partnerships.
Given the above, what safeguards are in place to ensure Australia retains absolute and unquestioned control over any and all foreign-based space and future military projects? Do we have the numbers and assets at all times to maintain physical supremacy over foreign projects when hosted in remote locations?
I am not being harsh. These are basic considerations of war generals throughout history.
How much taxpayer-funded investment in space joint ventures is truly owned and retained by Australia versus what India, or others, can walk away with?
Has this future trajectory of integrating India, rather than America, in our north-western defence strategy been thoroughly debated in Parliament and in front of the people? Were any deals with America sacrificed as part of this project? Or was this conducted with their future integration in mind? Have we made a decision, as a people, to make this potentially future-altering decision to pivot East over West?
I am asking these questions while Australia retains full control of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands.
Before conflict tests the strategy. Before its people re-consider independence. While we still have the opportunity to avoid the mistakes of the Port of Darwin.
In this venture, we are not ‘partners’, we are the owners of the invaluable geographic asset.
All I’m saying is I think we need to talk about it, rather than leaving the Cocos (Keeling) Islands as footnote beneath the uranium deal.
Alexandra Marshall is an independent writer. If you would like to support her work, shout her a coffee over at donor-box.
