Alliances require cooperation. The terms and conditions of such an arrangement should be understood in full before action is required.
In this case, the military relationship between Australia and the United States is something upon which rests the bulk of Australia’s national defence plan. They are our nuclear deterrent. Our sea mines. The moat around castle Australia.
That kind of Big Brother protection comes with a price tag which is often understood rather than stated.
This was acceptable when the world sat dormant – its superpowers content to busy themselves with commerce and minor regional disputes.
Those days are drawing to a close.
Australian politicians are seeking clarity regarding America’s interest in defending Australia against the likes of China – and its ability to succeed if full engagement took place. Australia also deserves to know what is required of its defence resources regarding threats to America and its allies. Are these arrangements the same for offensive action and defensive action?
If the peace between Iran and Israel fails, as it is likely to do, are Australian assets expected to make an appearance?
As an ally, what help can we expect about domestic terrorist reprisals on home soil directly related to Australian involvement in American-led conflict?
What level of intelligence sharing are we entitled to, or is our left-leaning, ideologically inconsistent government lowering Australia’s trustworthiness as we saw during the old war years when our allies viewed us on par with Russia…
Shadow Minister for Defence, Andrew Hastie, has been seeking transparency on American operations and presence within Australia.
Mr Hastie said:
‘When America conducts combat operations, we want to know what our level of involvement will be. I think if we’re going to have this close friendship going forward, it’s really important to understand exactly what that means.’
The conversation circles around the protection of sovereignty as military interactions intertwine.
As reported in the ABC:
The former soldier has also called for the government to explain what role Australia might play backing US combat operations launched from this country.
Also, the ‘government has consistently brushed off questions over whether the highly sensitive military facilities at Pine Gab or North West Cape provided intelligence’ for last weekend’s targeted strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations.
Conservatives may be concerned about the national security risks of answering these questions, and what their answers may mean for strategic partners. If China is prepared to punish our exports for criticising ethnic concentration camps, imagine what actions they may take if we help attack their allies, of which Iran and Russia both claim to be.
However, given that Russia and China probably have this information, even if the Australian press does not, we may wonder if the Prime Minister is more worried about the domestic political fallout if he verbalises the details of the arrangement.
We have already seen Greens and Independent politicians call for America to be kicked out of Pine Gap and America to be effectively side-lined in favour of China.
Suicidal and delusional, sure, but we don’t have geopolitical geniuses representing our interests in Canberra.
We have the victors of the Activist Hunger Games.
Who knows… Perhaps being invaded would suit their desire to seek spiritual meaning in oppression and salvation in punishment for perceived historical ills.
While it is difficult to muster sympathy for Albanese fronting hostile colleagues, the weakness of Labor in the face of confrontation may see the government do something reckless for the sake of a headline … such as kick America out of Pine Gap.
Can we trust Labor to be sensible and pragmatic?
Answer that one yourselves.
‘As our alliance grows and strengthens, we need to know what freedom of action we have within that alliance. And we also need to know what limits there are as well. And that way we can preserve both the alliance and Australian sovereignty, which is critical … I think it’s time that we had a mature, parties of government committee dedicated to defence so that we can have these debates.’
I don’t know, Mr Hastie. It may not be a good idea for the answers to those questions to be made public.
While China may have the gist of our relationship with America, the last two global conflicts taught us the benefit of uncertainty, particularly when dealing with regimented regimes. Communists like rules, order, and predictable scenarios. The forest of unknowns is what obstructs the paws of the tiger.
If China knows that America expressly will not declare war on Beijing if Australia is attacked, how does that change Australia’s security situation if the current answer is a giant risky question mark?
In times of war, clarity is the last thing you want.
Clarity gives the enemy the edges of the board from which they can start playing a dangerous game.
By all means, find out what our foreign engagement is, but I would warn the Shadow Defence Minister to be very careful about cleaning the glass on our defence enclosure and allowing our rivals a good look at our relationships.
There is another problem.
Ideally, Australia would like a solid bond of protection and a guarantee from America, but the chances of achieving that were much better before former Prime Ministers mouthed off about the current US President. This uncomfortable soundtrack has been accompanied by strategic disappointments and a failure to meet spending goals.
When speaking to David Speers, Mr Hastie added:
‘[US] Secretary Hegseth appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee … he talked about the Indo Pacific. He named communist China as the pacing threat – they’re his words, not mine. And he talked about the US building up its forward posture in the Indo Pacific and he spoke specifically of Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. And so we’re very much a part of the integrated deterrence that the US is building in the region. And I think the government needs to be clear with the Australian people what that means. We need greater transparency. I think we need to talk about operationalising the alliance, building guard rails for combat operations, and of course, defining our sovereignty. And this will make things clearer for us so that we can better preserve our national interest. We’re not just a vassal state, we’re an ally and a partner and I think it’s time we had a good discussion about what that looks like.’
This is the problem with conservatives. These are the kinds of conversations and plans that take place from an understanding that America must be retained as a primary defence partner.
However, Labor is weak on its support of America, extremely keen to throw Australia deeper into the arms of its ideological cousin in Beijing, and likely to listen to the Greens if it means making some sort of unimportant victory on a different issue.
By opening this conversation, Mr Hastie may end up the architect of an unintended consequence: the catastrophe of pushing America out of our orbit.
Mr Hastie’s depth and affection for the historical ties between America and Australia cannot be assumed in other politicians. His desire to prioritise clarity for military expedience is not everyone’s primary goal. The seriousness with which he perceives war may be non-existent in an individual wooed by Chinese diplomacy.
Before having these conversations, Mr Hastie, ask yourself, ‘Do I trust Labor with China?’
Flat White is written by Alexandra Marshall. If you would like to support her work, shout her a coffee over at donor-box.
