In 2021, the Aukus security pact was hailed as a bold reconfiguration of 21st Century deterrence strategy – a trilateral alignment between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States aimed at countering China’s assertive rise and reasserting Western naval dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Fast forward to mid-2025, and this celebrated alliance finds itself at an uncomfortable juncture. The Biden-to-Trump transition has triggered a Pentagon-led review of Aukus, casting a long shadow over one of the most ambitious military-industrial collaborations in recent memory.
While effectively termed a ‘routine review’, the reassessment has resurrected old anxieties: Can the US be trusted to honour long-term strategic commitments? Is Aukus another casualty of transactional geopolitics under the revived ‘America First’ doctrine? And what does this say about the future of US-led alliances in an increasingly multipolar world?
America First, Allies Second?
The Trump administration’s review of Aukus is not unexpected. ‘America First’ was never a slogan – it’s a worldview. One that sees multilateralism not as a given, but as a negotiable. Under this prism, alliances are not ends in themselves but levers of national advantage. Aukus, with its projected $239 billion submarine program, now faces scrutiny through this narrower lens: Is the US giving more than it gets?
Such reviews may be procedurally justifiable, but they are diplomatically disruptive. Congressional Democrats argue the review sends mixed signals, suggesting American alliances are only as enduring as the next presidential tweet. For middle powers like Australia and even nuclear-armed Britain, this unpredictability is a strategic risk in itself.
Australia’s Strategic Gamble and Domestic Political Tensions
For Canberra, Aukus isn’t just a policy – it’s a bet. A bet on the permanence of American power projection in the Indo-Pacific, and a belief that advanced submarines, AI collaboration, and cyber deterrence will bolster sovereignty in an increasingly hostile region.
Yet domestically, the pact faces increasing scrutiny. Opposition from the Australian Greens and factions within the Labor Party highlight concerns over strategic dependency, ballooning costs, and the implications of hosting nuclear-powered vessels in the region. Should US reliability waver, political pressures could intensify, potentially complicating Australia’s long-term commitments.
Britain’s Calculus: Atlanticism vs Indo-Pacific Tilt
For the UK, Aukus was a rare chance to prove Global Britain was more than a slogan. It allowed London to stretch its strategic relevance eastward while deepening defence industrial ties with Washington and Canberra. Now, the review raises awkward questions in Westminster. Is Britain merely a symbolic participant in a deal shaped by Washington and paid for by Canberra? And if Aukus begins to fray, where does that leave the UK’s Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’?
Budgetary pressures and growing public scepticism over overseas military engagements add complexity. Defence experts warn that Britain must reassess not just its contribution but its broader strategic dependencies if it is to maintain credible influence in the Indo-Pacific.
Francis Tusa, a British defence analyst, puts it starkly: ‘Treating ratified treaties as tradeable reflects on a state’s reliability and trustworthiness – unilaterally break them, and you are saying that you cannot be trusted.’ Aukus was always about more than submarines – it was a trust pact. Undermining it risks corroding the very credibility the West seeks to project.
Beyond Submarines: The Tech Race and Industrial Realities
Aukus’s ambitions extend well beyond nuclear submarines. It encompasses hyper-sonic missiles, quantum computing, cyber warfare, and AI-driven command and control systems. These cutting-edge capabilities require deep collaboration in technology transfer and intellectual property sharing among the three nations.
The Pentagon review raises doubts not only about submarine timelines but also about the US defence industrial base’s capacity to simultaneously support its own military needs and those of allies. American shipbuilding is bottlenecked by decades of under-investment, producing just two nuclear subs per year, while the Aukus plan demands far more. Could the UK’s Barrow shipyard or Australian industrial initiatives fill these gaps, or is the program’s scale simply unrealistic?
Regional Reactions: Allies and Adversaries Watching Closely
In Southeast Asia, Aukus was already controversial, perceived by some as a provocative escalation in a fragile regional balance. Indonesia, Malaysia, and others watch the US review warily, concerned about an arms race or diminished US engagement.
Meanwhile, partners such as Japan, South Korea, and India may question the durability of US commitments, not just in Aukus but across the Quad and other regional frameworks. AUS, UK, and US must therefore weigh the risks of sending mixed signals to allies at a critical geopolitical inflection point.
China’s Strategic Messaging and Diplomacy
From Beijing’s perspective, the US review is a propaganda gift. It reinforces the narrative that America is unreliable and inward-looking. China may seize the opportunity to accelerate diplomatic overtures and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, presenting itself as a steadier alternative to a wavering US-led alliance.
Broader Lessons for Alliance Management
Aukus’ moment of uncertainty illustrates a broader trend in alliance politics. Nato, the Quad, and the Five Eyes intelligence community all grapple with the challenges of maintaining unity amid divergent national priorities and rising populism.
Are we entering an era of ‘insurance multilateralism’ where partners hedge against US unpredictability by forming parallel or redundant security frameworks? The answer to this question will shape the future of Western collective security architecture.
Conclusion: Trilateral, Not Transactional
The core logic of Aukus – shared threat perceptions, interoperable technologies, and democratic alignment – remains intact. But logic alone doesn’t build submarines. Political will does. And that will is now on trial.
If the US proceeds with Aukus but demands disproportionate cost-sharing or strategic concessions, it may preserve the alliance in name while hollowing it out in substance. If it retreats altogether, the message to allies worldwide will be chilling: that American partnership is a short-term contract, not a long-term covenant.
Trust, not tonnage, is the true ballast of any alliance. If Aukus founders on the rocks of short-termism, the ripple effect may stretch far beyond the Pacific.
Aukus was supposed to be the future of trilateralism. Whether it now becomes a footnote in transactionalism depends not on strategic doctrine but political determination. It is time, once again, for Washington to decide what kind of ally it wants to be – and for Canberra and London to prepare contingencies in case that answer is not the one they hoped for.