The army’s soldiers and officers are greatly disappointed by the suspension of much necessary army training and cuts to the activity of the part-time army reserve. No amount of naive spin or over-simplistic briefing by ‘defence officials’ can disguise the inconvenient truth that these cuts lessen the fighting power, credibility and lethality of the army, reducing its ability to deter the Russian army and influence the US and Nato. Military expertise and fighting power will inexorably erode and become more difficult to sustain. In war, achieving mission success will become more difficult and casualties will increase.

Since 1990, successive governments’ reductions in defence spending greatly reduced the armed forces’ ability to fulfil their national and Nato tasks. Lord George Robertson led the MOD’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review. Its plan to rebuild and modernise military capability that had shrunk to dangerously low levels commanded the respect of the forces – provided that it was fully funded and rapidly implemented.

But the government’s handling of the Defence Investment Plan was a masterclass in dither, delay and dysfunctional debate that resulted in a very modest increase in defence funding, much of which has yet to be sourced. The forces welcomed the extra funding, but were quietly disappointed that it was insufficient to restore readiness quickly enough. As they have so often have done, they gritted their teeth, and set out to make the best of a bad job. But these unforeseen cuts mean that the army has just been kicked in the teeth.

Why is military training so important? War is bloody and chaotic – a dynamic and unpredictable contest where opponents are constantly seeking advantage over each another. The ‘fog of war’, fear, stress and physical effort mean that activities which are easy in peacetime can become very difficult in conflict.

Troops all need to be trained in their individual roles so they can fight and survive on an increasingly hostile battlefield and properly use their weapons and equipment. But they have little military value unless the team they belong to is trained in its role. This begins at the basic level, such as with the infantry fire team, armoured vehicle crew or gun crew. Training then needs to build up, climbing the levels of command, through company to battalion, brigade and division. This is known as collective training. It not only increases the effectiveness of the unit or formation, but also builds teamwork, comradeship and cohesion. I have myself experienced the intangible benefits such as the amazing sense of pride and confidence that comes from succeeding in well-run, challenging training in high-tempo armoured warfare, using live ammunition on the vast and harsh Canadian prairie.

Land warfare is very complex, requiring synchronisation of many capabilities, including armour, infantry, artillery, engineers, helicopters, drones, air defences and logistics. Just as sports teams need to practise together to counter demanding opponents, so armies need to train on realistic and challenging field exercises. But imagine a game of football or rugby in which both sides carry knives to attack each other. The fear and uncertainty would rise considerably.

In the Cold War, army battalions and regiments were highly trained, as were the brigades they belonged to. There was a regular cycle of training for the building blocks of the army’s three armoured divisions. This laid the foundations of the army’s high performance in both Iraq wars, Bosnia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. But after the army was committed to simultaneous counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, brigade war fighting exercises ceased. And when the army withdrew from Afghanistan in 2014, British brigade exercises did not restart – due to insufficient funding.

This was in contrast to the US army. From 2014 it resumed conducting brigade-level field exercises. Ten armoured brigades a year rotated through the US National Training Centre at Fort Irwin. Between 2014 and 2024, the British Army never achieved that level of brigade training. This gap in armoured and mechanised brigade exercise caused a generation gap in expertise in formation manoeuvre.

In 2025 the Army chief, General Sir Roly Walker, directed the army to better train to take on ‘bigger and better-equipped foes’. A discreet way of saying Russian forces. A new Land Training System was organised to annually exercise every single regular company, battery and squadron for 10 weeks training in their operational role. In the first year of the programme, almost all of the Army’s 460 companies, squadrons and batteries did this. And exercises for battalions and regiments increased.

Concurrently the army resumed exercising its manoeuvre brigades. Over the last two years half a dozen of these took place in England, Germany and Canada. They have been welcomed by the troops. The commanding officer of an infantry battalion on the 7th Brigade’s recent exercise in Germany observed that it was the first brigade exercise he had participated in during his 20-year career. By comparison, in the first 20 years of my career between 1976 and 1996, I participated in eight British brigade exercises.

The middle and senior leadership of the army includes many people who had served through the difficult wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, rising to the challenge. But their combat experience ceased in 2014. This could be seen by the very few campaign medals on the chests of younger troops at the Queen’s funeral and King’s coronation. The army of 2026 therefore includes very few people under the age of 35 who had fought against the Iraqi militias or the Taliban.

The training that is being cut is not an ‘inessential’ luxury

The training that is being cut is not an ‘inessential’ luxury. It is the absolute bedrock that the army needs to succeed in the missions that the government has accepted Britain should carry out for Nato. Cutting it will mean that the collective expertise of the army in fighting war will decline. This will be greatly welcomed in the Kremlin. As will the reduction in training levels of the army reserve. All of its units have a war role to perform, especially providing logistic and military support. The reserve is already struggling to find enough volunteers. These cuts will make this worse.

Defence Secretary Wes Streeting’s time as health secretary should have taught him the importance of training of medical staff as individuals, who then learn to work together as teams, in operating theatres, wards and A&E departments. If invited to approve a cut to the training of surgeons, operating room teams and A&E staff, would he have agreed to the increased risk of mistakes, accidents and avoidable deaths? Can he explain why he has just approved a similar measure for the army? He might also explain why he cannot close the reported £30 million gap in funding army training from elsewhere in his defence budget of £62 billion.