The recent German state elections in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and in the city state of Berlin give cause to consider the political direction of Germany.
In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is leading the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (SPD) with 38.2 per cent compared to 35.5 per cent for the SPD. The party of Chancellor Friedrich Merz, the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU), only received 4.9 per cent of the popular vote, a result that fails to reach the threshold for parliamentary representation. AfD’s electoral success comes a few weeks after scoring an astonishing 43.79 per cent in the election in Saxony-Anhalt. In the city state of Berlin, Die Linke (the Left) won the election with 25.7 per cent, compared with 18.8 per cent for the CDU and 16.3 per cent for the AfD.
The recent electoral successes of the AfD reflect a deep political transformation affecting not only Germany but much of the European Union (EU). Across the continent, traditional political loyalties are weakening; voters become more volatile and anti-establishment movements are gaining ground.
Germany has been slower to experience this change than many of its neighbouring countries, but the recent election results confirm that the political landscape is changing in ways that would have seemed improbable a decade ago. However, it would be a misreading of German politics to claim that the country is moving sharply to the right. Instead, it appears to be moving away from the centre, traditionally captured by the mainstream parties.
For most of the post-war period, Germany was a textbook example of political predictability and stability. Although governments changed, coalition partners rotated and parties rose and fell, the broad political centre remained remarkably stable. Hence, the question facing Germany today is whether the centrist political model that defined modern Germany can survive the anti-establishment pressures or whether AfD’s election results presage a lasting restructuring of the political landscape.
In this context, it is apposite to note that one of the most misunderstood aspects of German politics is the assumption that eastern Germany is inherently right-wing. History suggests otherwise. Following reunification, eastern German voters often supported left-wing parties, particularly those connected to the political traditions of the former German Democratic Republic. The present political reality is that many of Germany’s eastern states are not so much distinguished by conservatism but rather by a willingness to support parties that challenge the political elites who ruled Germany from the centre. Voters who once reliably supported centrist mainstream parties have become increasingly willing to experiment with alternatives, particularly when they feel that these traditional parties fail to address concerns about economic security, living standards, national identity, and immigration.
Immigration remains one of the most significant drivers of political debate in Germany. The AfD has built much of its support around arguments that Germany’s immigration policies are too permissive and that mainstream parties have failed to maintain effective control of borders and asylum systems. These themes continue to resonate with a substantial segment of the electorate.
Economic concerns are equally important. Germany’s post-war economic miracle rested heavily on a combination of powerful manufacturing industries, export competitiveness, affordable energy, and industrial leadership. In recent years, these pillars have come under pressure. The automotive industry faces profound transformation, energy costs remain a vital concern, and economic growth has slowed. Voters who once trusted mainstream parties to manage economic challenges are increasingly asking whether those parties are still able, or willing, to provide solutions to these challenges.
The electorate’s apathy discloses that trust, previously placed in Germany’s mainstream parties, is being eroded. Germany’s institutions, long viewed as beacons of trustworthiness, are now unmistakably showing signs of decline. This changed environment has provided the AfD with an opportunity to successfully position itself as the beneficiary of this malaise.
The reasons that have contributed to this decline are complex. Reunification brought enormous opportunities, but it also imposed significant economic disruption. Large industries disappeared, unemployment increased, and many younger residents moved west in search of opportunities. While living standards undoubtedly improved over the decades that followed, a feeling of disconnection from national decision-making persisted in some communities.
Today, AfD has captured much of the anti-establishment sentiment that once flowed toward parties on the left. The ideological vehicle has changed, but the underlying frustration remains remarkably similar. This is why eastern Germany is better understood as a region where voters have consistently demonstrated a greater willingness to challenge established political structures. The success of AfD in states such as Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania is therefore part of a much more complex story about representation, identity, and trust in institutions rather than a sudden ideological shift.
Within the EU, Germany was often regarded as an anchor of moderation, consensus, and institutional stability. Now, across Europe, trust in political institutions, established parties and governing elites has been weakening steadily. The most instructive comparison for Germany may be France, where three major blocs dominate the political landscape: the left, the centrist movement associated with Emmanuel Macron, and the right-of-centre National Rally led by Marine Le Pen. While France wrestled with political upheaval, Italy experienced repeated governmental instability. Austria periodically embraced populist insurgencies. The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) travelled a path that in some ways resembles AfD’s current trajectory. It grew through anti-establishment messaging, a strong emphasis on immigration issues and appeals to voters who felt neglected by traditional parties. The crucial difference is that Austria, unlike Germany that implemented a ban on collaborating with the AfD, eventually integrated the FPÖ into government coalitions.
Germany’s so-called ‘firewall’ remains one of the defining features of contemporary German politics, with mainstream parties refusing cooperation with AfD despite the party’s growing electoral success. Supporters argue that this approach protects democratic norms and prevents the normalisation of positions they consider unacceptable. Critics worry that it enables AfD to reinforce its outsider image and portray itself as a movement excluded by an unresponsive and undemocratic political establishment.
As Europe’s largest economy, Germany plays a vital role in shaping European policy on immigration, energy, defence, industrial strategy, and economic management. What happens in Berlin influences decisions made across the EU. This reality gives Germany’s political evolution significance beyond its national borders. A more fragmented Germany could contribute to a more fragmented Europe. A politically weakened German government may find it harder to provide leadership on issues requiring long-term strategic vision. This explains, at least in part, why state-level election results have attracted so much international attention.
What happens next? Predicting politics is always risky, but several outcomes appear plausible. In the near term, the most likely scenario is continued fragmentation. AfD will probably remain a major force. The mainstream parties are likely to maintain the firewall. Coalition negotiations will become increasingly complicated. Governments may become more fragile and less decisive.
The economy will almost certainly be decisive. If Germany succeeds in revitalising growth, restoring industrial competitiveness and improving living standards, support for anti-establishment parties could stabilise or decline. If economic stagnation persists, the incentives driving voters toward alternatives are likely to remain.
The next significant test will come in western Germany. If AfD demonstrates the same strength in western states that it has already established in parts of eastern Germany, concern about its long-term prospects will grow considerably.
Germany’s desertion of mainstream parties is a warning that countries, like Australia, should not be complacent. Australia appears considerably more stable than Germany at present, yet the underlying political pressures are surprisingly similar. Housing affordability, rising living costs, declining trust in institutions and frustration with established political parties are familiar themes in Australian politics. While Australia’s major parties continue to dominate parliamentary proceedings, signs of voter volatility are increasingly visible through the election of independents and the surging popularity of the One Nation Party.
Of course, Australia’s political system differs from the German system because it still channels dissatisfaction through relatively stable structures. Its preferential voting system tends to favour moderation and coalition-building. Australia’s geographic separation also contributes to a different immigration debate. While immigration remains politically sensitive, many Australians maintain confidence that border policy remains under national control. Germany’s experience should nevertheless serve as a warning against complacency.
The electoral developments in Germany enable commentators to speculate about the possible features of politics in the future. This may be in the form of a partial restoration of centrist politics. Although this remains possible, it appears increasingly challenging given the structural changes already underway. Or Austria’s experience, where a party initially regarded as unacceptable eventually becomes integrated into governing arrangements after years of strong electoral performance, may be emulated. Or Germany may evolve into a permanent multi-bloc political system where no single party or alliance dominates, and coalition-building becomes the defining feature of governance.
Of these possibilities, the latter scenario appears the most plausible. Germany increasingly resembles a society experiencing political fragmentation, rather than one preparing for a dramatic ideological shift. Importantly, fragmentation does not necessarily imply instability. It does, however, imply complexity. Governments become harder to form. Compromises become more difficult. Political debates become more polarised. Elections matter more because outcomes become less predictable.
Hence, whether AfD ultimately thrives or fades may not be the most important question. More significant is whether Germany can rebuild confidence in the institutions that have underpinned its success since reunification. If citizens regain confidence that economic opportunity is expanding, living standards are improving and migration is being managed effectively, support for anti-establishment movements may stabilise or decline. If those concerns remain unresolved, today’s political shifts could become permanent.
