The US perception of achievements in Iran is a double-edged sword.

The US administration may assume it has destroyed the position of the Vali-e Faqih (exonym: the Supreme Leader), and that this constitutes an achievement. Yet this has not made the regime any less ideological; rather, it has deprived it of a focal point (both operationally and ideologically) that once gave coherence to its posture for the inside and outside.

The Vali-e Faqih, whether Mojtaba Khamenei is dead or alive, can no longer function as the ultimate arbiter within the Islamic regime.

Now, regardless of what the US does or says, all Guard Corps of the Islamic Revolution must rely on two forces: their survival instinct and their foundational ideological beliefs. Their survival instinct tells them they will die either way: either in jihad against the ‘arrogant’ America or through the revenge of the public. So, they see no option but to resist.

Their foundational texts and beliefs, in the absence of a functioning Vali-e Faqih, tell them that the Islamic Revolution must continue until the Hidden Imam re-emerges. Since the Hidden Imam does not exist in any practical sense, the implication is that jihad continues in perpetuity, against the US, Israel, and those in between.

What may appear as an achievement to some in the US administration is, in fact, the unleashing of fragmented ideological factions that will fight to the last, even without centralised coordination. You may capture Tehran or Qeshm, but other provincial units of the Guards of the Islamic Revolution will continue fighting.

If negotiation is not a tactic aimed at precipitating the regime’s economic collapse and providing material support to the Iranian people, it will instead bring greater chaos and suffering to the region and the world.

The Islamic regime has suffered enormously in this war, but not enough to collapse. This is partly because it prepared in advance for the loss of leadership and its command structure, and partly because it calculated that the United States – under Trump – would eventually lose interest and shift its focus elsewhere, as it had done with Russia and Yemen’s Houthis.

Operation Epic Fury not only degraded the IRGC’s naval, missile and defence capabilities, but also disrupted key sources of regime revenue. For instance, up to 85 per cent of petrochemical export capacity and 70 per cent of steel production were affected, with major hubs such as Mahshahr and South Pars sustaining significant damage.

At the same time, Operation Economic Fury, carried out through the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz for the regime’s vessels, has sharply reduced Iran’s oil exports. The US counter-blockade of Iranian ports, in response to the IRGC’s actions at the Strait, demonstrated that control of a chokepoint depends on managing escalation within it; something the regime is unable to do.

The million-dollar question is why Trump would choose to pause Project Freedom and negotiate at this stage. One argument is that negotiations continue even during the kinetic phase of conflicts; indeed, one might expect talks to precede a formal surrender by one side.

From the regime’s perspective, the United States lacks the capacity to sustain prolonged engagement and, under mounting domestic and international pressure, seeks a deal to save face. This perception helps some voices explain why the US administration appears so eager to negotiate.

Yet economic pressure on the regime is real and intensifying. The effects of the Strait of Hormuz disruption are felt not only in Iran, but across Europe, Australia, the Persian Gulf states, and Asia. China has leveraged its ties with Tehran to secure the release of several of its tankers. Gulf states have offset some losses by selling oil at higher prices through alternative channels. Those bearing the greatest cost are the Islamic regime itself, along with Europe and Australia.

It is striking that Europe and Australia now find themselves on the same side of this equation as the Islamic regime – a consequence of earlier policy miscalculations. Under pressure, they are deploying mine-sweeping capabilities to the region. Despite earlier reluctance to engage, they are now compelled to act to avoid escalating domestic energy costs.

Now, if Trump’s strategy is to use negotiations as a tool of coercion – pushing the regime toward systemic collapse while shifting the burden of energy costs onto other economies, then support for the Iranian people is not only right but necessary. Iranian people never stopped fighting the Islamic regime and its guards. The right course of strategy was reiterated by Iran’s Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi in Odessa at the Black Sea Security Forum as recently as May 30: maximum pressure on the Islamic Republic, maximum support for the Iranian people, maximum defections from within the regime, maximum mobilisation of Iranians, and the Iran Prosperity Project. This will lead to real regime change in Iran, a geopolitical realignment of the Middle East, and improved global security.

Reza Arab is a lecturer at the University of Queensland, and a political advisor to the Iran Prosperity Project.