In a provincial Russian city, a man who runs a logistics company is summoned to see the regional administration. There, beneath a framed photo of Vladimir Vladimirovych Putin hanging on the wall, he is told to supply fourteen men for the front. He would rather keep his people, many of whom have worked for him for years, so he places an advertisement, hires fourteen strangers at a good wage and hands them over to the army.
This is the opening of Andrey Zvyagintsev’s Minotaur, his first film in nearly a decade. It won the Grand Prix at Cannes in May, and in September the Russian government declared the film-maker a foreign agent. In what may be the best criticism of the war so far from a Russian dissident, and certainly in the realm of film, Zvyagintsev argues that Russia’s war is not imposed upon society: it is of its own making.
Moscow and the rest of Russia’s comfortable classes live by an unspoken deal with the regime
The film’s title comes from the Greek myth of the Minotaur, a monster born from King Minos’s greed and confined to a labyrinth. After defeating Athens, Minos forces the city’s people to send seven young men and seven young women as tribute to feed the creature. Much like today’s Russia.
Since the autumn of 2022, Russian law has required employers to keep military files on their staff and hand enlistment offices lists of suitable men. Four years on, that practice has hardened into written quotas. In March of this year, the governor of the Ryazan region ordered every firm with 150 or more workers to name candidates for military contracts, and in Siberia, business owners who fall short pay about £4,400 for each missing recruit. The quota reaches hospitals and universities too: the former owes two staff, and the latter have been told to deliver one contract soldier for every 50 students.
Russian officials – chinovniks – fill their quotas the way that Russians go about getting a hospital bed or a building permit. Someone knows someone or pays someone, and the problem moves on to whoever has the fewest means of moving it further. To the unfortunate. In practice that tends to be a man from Buryatia or Tuva who signs a contract because of the pay, or an inmate in a penal colony, for whom the contract is a way out. The man in Moscow with a steady job and a relative in a ministry is usually left alone.
The Khanty-Mansi region in western Siberia pays 4.1 million roubles (about £38,000) to anyone who signs up, more than twelve years of pay at the minimum wage. They get little time to enjoy the money, however: a new Russian recruit arriving on the battlefield survives just 20 to 30 minutes on average, according to American estimates. About half of Russians live in small towns and villages, but these communities account for two-thirds of the country’s confirmed military deaths in Ukraine. In Tuva, the war has killed 120 of every 10,000 men. In Moscow, the figure is three in 10,000, the lowest in the country.
The protagonist of Nikolai Gogol’s Dead Souls, Pavel Ivanovich Chichikov, made his fortune buying dead souls. Modern Russia has improved on the arrangement by trading the living. Since August, 56 of the country’s 83 regions have paid referral bonuses to anyone signing up a recruit. There is now a bring-a-friend offer for the front, while state television has warned of ‘black widows’ who marry poor men for the grobovye, the coffin money paid out when they die. The Russian media has dubbed it ‘coffinomics’. And for those still troubled by moral doubts, the Russian Orthodox Church offers indulgence, with its head, Patriarch Kirill, promising that death in the line of military duty ‘washes away all the sins’ a man has committed.
Moscow and the rest of Russia’s comfortable classes live by an unspoken deal with the regime: stay loyal, stay out of politics, and you keep your money and your sons. Much like Zvyagintsev’s Minotaur’s protagonist Gleb. He has a large house, a wife he seems to love, and a teenage son. He is neither a committed patriot nor an outspoken opponent of the invasion of Ukraine. His opinions about the war, so far as he has any, extend to wishing it would leave him in peace. For him and for most Russians, the war is background noise, on smartphones here and there, a recruitment billboard by the road and talk of co-workers slipping off toward the Georgian border, while the dinners and drinking carry on.
The film is loosely based on Claude Chabrol’s 1969 film The Unfaithful Wife. Gleb suspects that his wife, Galina, is seeing someone, hires a detective to follow her, and learns that the man is a younger photographer. He goes to the photographer’s flat, and despite not initially intending to, snaps and kills him. When Gleb gets home, he says nothing to Galina. In time she learns that he knows about the affair and what he has done, but she too keeps quiet rather than disturb the comfort they share. Their marriage continues on the same terms as the country around it.
Russians have long spoken of the state as something that happens to them, like the weather. ‘My hut is at the edge, I know nothing’ goes the proverb. The state is to be feared and, where possible, avoided. Trying to hold the people in power to account is regarded as the occupation of fools and foreign agents, and the clever man instead looks after his own. What Zvyagintsev shows, with some cruelty, is that once Gleb has something to lose, he behaves exactly like those above him and like Putin.
A Russian man can help send others to die in Ukraine and feel no remorse
In March, the Levada Center found that 72 per cent of Russians supported their military’s actions in Ukraine, while only 17 per cent opposed them. The war is woven into the society. Kindergartens dress toddlers in uniform for parades, and Russia’s biggest online marketplaces sell stuffed bears in military fatigues with a Z on the sleeve. The one time Moscow’s celebrities have so far gotten in trouble over the war has been for an ‘almost naked’ party in December 2023. Several stars apologised on camera dressed in turtlenecks for their bad taste rather than for the war.
The Kremlin calls its veterans Russia’s ‘true elite’, and by June, Meduza had counted 1,305 of them in government posts or elected office, up from 45 appointments in 2023. Nearly 200 stood in September’s Duma election. The rest are sent into classrooms. Starting this year, companies must reserve about 1 per cent of their jobs for veterans. They are recruited as kindergarten teachers, school psychologists and even ballet dancers and employers are prohibited from asking about post-traumatic disorders. Meanwhile, primetime talk shows stage family feuds over a dead soldier’s payout, with relatives fighting on air over who gets the money.
The philosopher Hannah Arendt, writing about personal responsibility under dictatorship, rejected the notion of collective guilt. As she warned that ‘where all are guilty, no one is’. People who give orders, those who willingly carry them out, and those who resist at considerable personal risk cannot be assigned the same guilt or responsibility. But Arendt also challenged the argument that people who participate in wrongdoing are merely obeying orders. The question, she suggested, should be why they supported what was being done.
War is an ugly business, and plenty of states pay poor men to fight. Russia’s war is wrong for a deeper reason. St. Augustine, who laid the foundations of the just war, allowed a war only to right a wrong already done. This, however, is a war of choice. Putin’s came first, but the war runs on millions of smaller ones. In his film Leviathan, Zvyagintsev had already shown how power can force people to submit and blur right and wrong. Even the Church, which ought to be able to tell the people what is moral and what is not, ends up teaching those who suffer under it that obedience is a virtue and protects the powerful it has made a Faustian gamble with.
The 19th-century Russian Orthodox bishop Ignatius Bryanchaninov wrote that conscience dulls by degrees. Each time a man goes against his morals, it becomes easier to do so again. In time, he can do what once kept him awake and take the fact that he sleeps soundly as proof that his conscience is clear. For Bryanchaninov, this represented a loss of inner freedom.
This is what has happened to Russian society under Putin. As dissent has become more dangerous, many Russians have grown accustomed to treating what it does to other people as the state’s business and do not feel responsible.
Russians swallowed the takeover of NTV, the last independent national television channel, and the 2006 murder of Anna Politkovskaya, the journalist who exposed atrocities in Chechnya. They backed the war against Georgia as a necessary one. They watched police break up the protests at Bolotnaya Square in 2012 and two years later cheered the ‘return’ of Crimea while looking away from the war Russia had started in eastern Ukraine. They took in their stride the murder of Boris Nemtsov, the opposition leader shot within sight of the Kremlin. When some thousands were detained or arrested for protesting against the war and then Alexei Navalny, Putin’s best-known critic, died in an Arctic prison, they shrugged.
By the time Putin had ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, that practice was already well established. A Russian man can help send others to die in Ukraine and feel no remorse.
In the last part of Minotaur, the police investigating the photographer’s disappearance find evidence that would solve the case. Then an order comes down from above and the inquiry is dropped. The system that was supposed to deliver justice ends up protecting injustice instead. In his book The City of God, St. Augustine asked: ‘Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies?’ Russia has become exactly that.












