On Sunday morning, Israelis – those who hadn’t already spent part of the night in bomb shelters or safe rooms, unable to sleep – woke up to the good news that nearly all of the approximately 300 missiles and drones fired from Iran hours earlier had been destroyed before crossing into Israeli airspace. One Israeli was injured in the attack, but no one was killed. As has been the case since the 7 October disaster that marked the start of the war in Gaza, Israel’s military and technological prowess had performed successfully and efficiently.

No less impressive than the military feat of keeping these weapons from hitting their targets in Israel (the one exception was a missile that struck and caused minor damage at a Negev air base in the south, and a young girl in a Bedouin village in the south was critically wounded) was the fact that Israel was assisted in its near-hermetic defence by not only American forces, but also by British, French and Jordanian air power as well. As former prime minister and Israel Defense Forces chief of staff Ehud Barak tweeted on Sunday morning, it was an ‘unprecedented achievement’. He added his hope that the operation could be the opening to a ‘historic opportunity to establish a regional alliance opposed to Iran and its proxies’.

Today, even those who were once close to Netanyahu don’t claim to understand his behaviour

When the Gaza war began six months ago, there were many who hoped that the very horrific nature of both the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel and the Israeli bombing campaign and ground invasion of Gaza that followed might present a historic opportunity to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians, rather than continuing to simply ‘manage’ it. The public had been lulled into believing the occupation and creeping annexation could continue indefinitely with no resolution. For the first time in years, international attention was focused on the subject, and the stars seemed to align in a way that might allow for an internationally sponsored peace effort. That could, in turn, even lead to a comprehensive process of reconciliation between Israel and the Arab and Sunni Muslim states not already at peace with it. Foremost among them, of course, is Saudi Arabia, which as early as 2002 put its Arab peace initiative on the table; to this day it has not rescinded it.

Even if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu were willing to negotiate with the Palestinians over an arrangement that would grant them national self-determination while guaranteeing Israel’s security needs, he is locked into a governing partnership with politicians (including from his own party) who view the Israel-Palestine conflict as a zero-sum game that can only have one winner. As a consequence, the Israeli government will not even discuss a plan for ‘the day after’ in Gaza, because it is clear the disparate parties in the coalition would never be able to agree on the ultimate goals of the war. (None of this is to deny that Hamas seems no less interested than Israel in ending the war; in releasing the Israeli captives it still holds – perhaps because many of them are no longer alive; and certainly not in resolving the larger conflict in a way that has a place for the State of Israel.)

The fact that Israel’s peace treaties with both Egypt and Jordan, and the more recent Abraham Accords, which led to diplomatic relations with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, are still intact six months into the war, is evidence of the strategic importance these states attribute to Israel. This is particularly true in the struggle they are all waging against Iran and its Shi’ite axis. It is undeniable, however, that Israel’s relentless campaign in Gaza has put a strain on each of those relationships – all of which are based on common interests, not common values. Israel’s relations with the United States, with whom it is supposed to share common values, has also suffered significant damage, and may look very different when Joe Biden is no longer president.

During most of his three decades in Israeli politics, including 17 years as prime minister, Netanyahu has been widely viewed as a cautious pragmatist, who would go to lengths to avoid taking risks either in war or for peace. Today, even those who were once close to him don’t claim to understand his behaviour. What seems clear is that his political survival, which is closely tied to his desire to stay out of prison, is his highest priority. This explains his decision to form and remain in a government with the most radically right-wing and anti-Arab politicians Israel has ever spawned.

This makes it hard to take much comfort from the relatively low price Israel paid last night for its presumed decision on 1 April to assassinate General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, Iran’s top military official in Syria, adjacent to Iran’s embassy in Damascus. (Israel has not officially taken responsibility for the attack, which also killed seven members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.) Iran has indicated that this current round with Israel, the first time it has ever attacked Israeli soil directly, ‘can be deemed concluded’, in the words of a statement from its United Nations mission, while warning against the response that further escalation by Israel would elicit.

Although Benjamin Netanyahu still possesses the tactical skills and ruthlessness that have allowed him to out-manoeuvre the most wily of his competitors, his strategic judgment shows evidence of being damaged beyond repair. Throughout his entire career, he has insisted that Iran constitutes an existential threat to Israel, and acted as though he was the leader chosen by destiny to save Israel from that threat. Could it be that today, in the ignominious twilight of his career, having failed to date to halt Iran’s advancement towards nuclear-weapons capability, Netanyahu may have concluded that the moment of truth has arrived, and with it the ultimate showdown with the Islamic Republic, whatever the cost?