A century ago today, Robert Mugabe was born. The man who would come to rule over Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2017 was a brutal and autocratic tyrant. Mugabe shattered his country’s economy, oversaw vicious human rights abuses and left public services, especially healthcare, in ruins. But while Britain would ultimately see Mugabe as an adversary, it played a key role in his rise to power.

Mugabe was, of course, not any western government’s ideal candidate to lead a newly independent African nation. He was a Marxist-Leninist who believed in command economics; in his guerrilla phase in the 1970s, Mugabe had been given unconditional support by the People’s Republic of China. But Britain was not presented with an ideal choice. Margaret Thatcher’s government needed to resolve the crisis in Rhodesia: Mugabe seemed the best man to deliver a stable settlement for the country and the region.

Thatcher is said to have ‘despised’ Mugabe

Mugabe came to power under the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, the 1979 concordat which concluded the Rhodesian Bush War and allowed the transition from a white minority-ruled international pariah to an independent, democratic nation with a formal constitution. The United Kingdom sponsored the conference which produced the agreement, foreign secretary Lord Carrington taking the chair and his cabinet colleague Lord Soames implementing its terms on the ground as the last governor of Southern Rhodesia.

The British government rightly regarded the establishment of Zimbabwe as a success. A 15-year crisis over Rhodesia was brought to an end, the process of decolonisation was concluded, and regional instability was resolved. The agreement paved the way for elections in 1980 which were regarded by international observers as free and fair under the circumstances and which broadly reflected the wishes of the people.

The great rival to Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) had been the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo. Once a Methodist lay preacher, Nkomo was a Georgist who rejected the concept of land ownership. He had led his movement from neighbouring Zambia, where ZAPU’s armed wing had been equipped and trained by the Soviet Union.

The period 1979-80 was a dark one in the Cold War. The East-West détente of the 1970s was running out of momentum. Poland faced an economic crisis as it suffered its first recession since the Second World War. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, leading to a 67-nation boycott of the Olympics in Moscow the following summer. Inevitably, then, Thatcher, newly elected as prime minister and dubbed ‘the Iron Lady’ by Soviet propaganda, saw Zimbabwe through the lens of the wider conflict.

Thatcher’s feelings on Rhodesia had been mixed. When she had reluctantly sacked Winston Churchill, grandson of the war leader, from her front bench in 1978 after voting against sanctions, her letter had carried the heartfelt postscript ‘I too feel strongly about events in Rhodesia – we all do’. Her instinct was to recognise the compromise ‘internal settlement’ of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, which brought together the United African National Council of Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the previously ruling Rhodesian Front; Ian Smith, prime minister since 1964, became minister without portfolio (Nkomo dubbed him ‘minister with all the portfolios’).

It was the decisive pragmatism – one of her great strengths – that allowed Thatcher quickly to see three things: first, that Muzorewa’s government was a non-starter; second, that the overwhelming priority was achieving a stable independent Zimbabwe; third, Mugabe was also a pragmatist, willing to give assurances about the future state, and that his assumption of power was the best defence against Soviet influence in the region.

This was not a dream outcome. Thatcher is said to have ‘despised’ Mugabe, and Carrington called him ‘devious and clever…the archetypal cold fish’, but she perceived him as someone with whom she could co-operate, and a source of stability. Ultimately, endorsing him was the best option on the table.

Robert Mugabe meets Margaret Thatcher at 10 Downing Street in 1980 (Credit: Getty Images)

We need to recall the lesson of Lancaster House in today’s international climate. Opponents of assistance to Ukraine like to point at corruption in the government in Kyiv or president Zelenskyy’s supposed autocratic tendencies, which may be valid criticisms. But the West faces a stark binary choice: support Zelenskyy, or acknowledge that Vladimir Putin will prevail. The president of the Russian Federation has made no secret of his hostility to the very notion of Ukrainian identity. For a pragmatist, surely the choice between Zelenskyy and Putin is no choice at all.

The same kind of realism needs to apply to our approach to the Middle East. Israel or Hamas? Acknowledging opposition to the conduct of its campaign in Gaza, it has to be Israel. Our current engagement against the Houthi movement in Yemen is just the façade of the wider regional binary: Saudi Arabia or Iran? Again, acknowledging the excesses of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, we have to stand with Riyadh when the chips are down.

There is room for idealism in the principles which underlie our foreign policy. We simply fool ourselves, however, if we pretend we can always avoid unpleasant choices and enjoy an inviolable sense of virtue. Any country which seeks to play a role on the world stage will encounter situations in which success is defined as selecting the least bad option. That was what Thatcher, ably advised by Carrington, quickly grasped with Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in 1979, and that is why the UK helped put Mugabe into power. Did it turn out well? Of course not. Was it the right decision at the time? Without question.