Australia is facing extraordinary and unprecedented new security pressures, as the world becomes increasingly prone to warfare, post-pandemic. During these sensitive times, particularly surrounding growing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, it is essential that we work hard to guard our sovereignty and chart a new defence and intelligence pathway going forward, lest we risk escalating conflict or doing further damage through ‘meddling’ in situations we are realistically not prepared for.
That begins with rethinking the growing willingness of Canberra to align too closely with Nato — even as we remain a non-member — and with resisting the creeping entanglement of foreign-led security obligations that could pull us into distant wars, strain our defence capacity, and divert vast resources away from domestic priorities. Since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, Australia has contributed 1.5 billion dollars in assistance. Several citizens are beginning to ask whether these funds should be invested back into our economy, to bolster Australian defences.
In June 2025, the government announced fresh cooperation with Nato during the Nato Summit, including deployment of a Royal Australian Air Force E-7A Wedgetail aircraft in the region to be used for military assistance. The argument for greater involvement is usually ‘we must stop Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’ however, our efforts in a foreign region should not come at the expense of Australia’s own national security and ability to operate as a sovereign country.
Nato, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is, after all, a body we never elected. It is deeply entrenched with the European Commission. Several ambassadors of Nato are also in strategic partnerships with the European Commission. Many Australians are starting to wonder whether Nato is the ‘World Health Organisation’ equivalent to our defence forces.
Political leaders argue a partnership with Nato reflects solidarity with our allies. But we must ask: solidarity with whom – and to what end? Australia is not a Nato member. We have not elected the decision-makers who determine Nato strategy, war-fighting priorities, or allocations of collective-response assets. Yet we risk becoming de facto contributors to a variety of foreign conflicts simply through obligatory ‘co-operation’.
The recent push within Nato – underscored in the 2025 summit – for member states to commit 5 per cent of GDP annually to defence and security spending by 2035, also sets a worrying benchmark. That benchmark already exerts pressure worldwide, including in Australia. Critics warn that such a goal or similar targets, if adopted by non-members under external influence, would impose a significantly higher financial burden than is reasonable. Given even some Nato members struggle to meet a 2 per cent GDP target, the logic of transposing such a benchmark onto Australia – with entirely different strategic circumstances – is deeply flawed.
The consequence of deeper financial obligations would be a steadily increasing defence budget. Under current national planning, total defence funding is projected to climb from around 2.0 per cent of GDP now to roughly 2.3-2.4 per cent over the next decade. Not only are financial strains increasing, but our defence force is struggling to meet current recruitment thresholds to sustain even our own local bases. In fact, the current projection is that our defence recruitment numbers will continue to decrease, not increase – and even that assumes best-case procurement and staffing. There is no guarantee that we will gain the capabilities we need locally – especially if large chunks are diverted to overseas commitments or burden-sharing in theatres far from our region.
In this context, Canberra should resist external pressure to mirror Nato spending or to align itself with obligations that assume manpower, infrastructure and industrial capacity far beyond our means. The idea that Australia could match a 5 per cent GDP-defence burden is therefore not only impractical – it threatens to hollow out our ability to defend core interests at home.
Moreover, Nato’s deepening institutional collaboration with the European Commission raises fundamental questions about national sovereignty. Over the decades, Nato and the European Union have institutionalised cooperation on crisis management, hybrid threats, military mobility, capability development and a shared strategic outlook across the Euro-Atlantic.
This combination creates what can be described as a ‘trans-Atlantic security tentacle’: a security-industrial network that binds together states under a common strategic umbrella. For European countries with shared geography and history, that might seem logical – but for a distant, Pacific-facing Australia, such entanglement represents a drift away from independent decision-making tailored to our region.
Further muddying global institutions is the rising influence of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on military matters. How much of Australia’s military strategy overseas should be governed by non-citizens?
The push to elevate members of some of these bodies into broader ‘global governance’ role risks consolidating influence in international institutions that are already increasingly politicised – with outcomes driven less by objective assessments, and more by alliance and bloc allegiances.
If Australia continues expanding its cooperation with Nato and broader Western security institutions we risk becoming a junior partner in conflicts and obligations we did not choose, under leaders we do not elect, led by institutions whose priorities may not align with ours, politically or morally.
We have an obligation to ourselves, the Constitution, and to future Australians to resist being drawn into globalist security networks. Our defence planning should prioritise national sovereignty, regional security needs, and a self-reliant intelligence and information infrastructure – not under-elected, far-away bureaucracies.
Before we commit more personnel, capability or funds to foreign-led endeavours, we must ask: who really benefits? Is it Australia – or another nebulous alliance with questionable leadership?
It is time Australia thinks seriously about limiting collaboration where possible, with entities that are not ‘Australia First’, lest it risks betraying the taxpayer who the government is lawfully bound to protect, while counterproductively putting the needs of those the Constitution does not protect, ahead of them.
It is for this reason, deepening our co-operation with Nato should be firmly re-evaluated, and a healthy distance should be maintained where possible. If Australia wants a prosperous and secure community well into the future, it is time we start prioritising our own backyard before we seek to defend anyone else’s.
