There are inevitably voices in the West questioning the value of committing more than £5.5 billion a month in support of the war in Ukraine. It looks for now deadlocked at best, and at worst – in light of the recent Russian capture of Avdiivka – a slow defeat. Yet it is important to realise just how the Ukraine war matters to the world outside that country’s borders, even if perhaps not quite in the ways some would suggest.

There is much overheated talk about a Ukrainian defeat leading to a direct threat to Nato. Some presume that this means the whole country falling to Vladimir Putin and Russian troops drawn up along the Romanian border. However, the whole notions of what a Ukrainian ‘defeat’ means now are as hazy as a ‘victory.’ Furthermore, suggestions that it would only take a few years for Moscow to reconstitute its badly-mauled forces so that it can launch a new war make some very questionable assumptions about Russia’s industrial capacity, its ability to keep spending at a breakneck rate, and Putin’s interest in any such dangerous adventure.

However, if Ukraine falls, or is forced to accept some ugly peace on Moscow’s terms, then this will likely lead to recriminations and masochistic soul-searching with the Nato alliance and the wider ‘Collective West’. This will likely leave it divided and weakened. It will also be much less secure. There may be no evidence that Putin is currently contemplating a real threat to the West, but he (or a successor) might be tempted if, for example, Nato fragmented or lost its deterrent value.

This is also a global issue. Putin is not out to destroy or rewrite the whole international order, but it is under pressure. Western leaders love to preach about their values-based foreign policy, but in the Global South this tends to be greeted with scepticism verging on the derisive. There’s the invasion of Iraq, the invasion and then abandonment of Afghanistan, the willingness to recognise politically-useful kleptocrats and authoritarians. The list of reasons to question our ‘values-based policies’ is as long as it is depressing.

Putin is not out to destroy or rewrite the whole international order, but it is under pressure.

Instead, the West’s real leverage is to a large extent because it is rich and powerful. The ignominious retreat from Afghanistan has already delivered a distinct blow to its credibility. Although China’s Belt and Road Initiative has not proven quite as effective and sustainable a tool of global influence as anticipated, nonetheless Beijing’s efforts to create its own parallel world order cannot help but gain when the West is distracted, humiliated and divided.

Of course, the nature of the future Ukraine will be determined by this war, too – and that is something that matters to more than just Ukrainians. Will this large country become a Russian vassal state, likely triggering a further exodus of millions of refugees? Will it be left an embittered rump state, forced into political and territorial concessions to Moscow, yet torn between hatred of an imperial aggressor to the east and resentment at the Western powers which encouraged it to fight, then abandoned it to its fate?

Or will it become a new, enthusiastic ally, whose energy and innovative spirit have been demonstrated throughout this war? Reintegrating liberated territories, rebuilding a battered country, and finally reforming institutions still undermined by habits of corruption and oligarchic power will not be quick, cheap or easy, but the potential gains are immense.

The outcome of the war will help define Russia’s future. Will the war be its Suez Crisis or Algerian War, the humbling moment when a former great power is forced to come to terms with its diminished status and begin to confront its imperial demons? Or will Putin extract from his misbegotten invasion enough that he can spin as a triumph, reconsolidating his threadbare legitimacy and encouraging him into further adventures?

Of course, the nature of the likely victory or defeat is still unclear. The maximalist goals of each side – a return to pre-2014 borders, security guarantees, reparations and war crimes tribunals for Kyiv, total control over the regions declared annexed and a neutral and neutered rump Ukraine for Moscow – are equally unlikely. The real outcome is going to be somewhere in between – but it still matters greatly quite where it ends up along that terrifyingly broad spectrum.