Recently US Under-Secretary of Defense, Elbridge Colby, announced a review of the Aukus agreement.  Our Defence Minister Richard Marles claimed this was just a routine audit that any incoming administration would undertake.  Ho-hum. But is that true, and is the agreement safe?

Add to a persuasive argument from Colby – the essence of which, from an Australian perspective, I shall outline below – the contempt the Albanese government has shown towards the US on a number of fronts, including defence spending and, more recently, its tepid response to the spectacularly successful Iran strike, and I think it is more likely than not that Trump will give it the thumbs down.

Actually, I think this is what Albanese is quietly working toward. How else to explain his total lack of interest in lobbying for Aukus? Make no mistake, this review is no routine box-ticking audit. Colby has made no secret of his opposition to Pillar 1 (the nuclear subs). If this is cancelled it would allow Albanese to walk away from Aukus and to blame President Trump at the same time.  And in doing so remove an irritant to his bestie, Xi Jinping. A win-win-win for our duplicitous Prime Minister.

But what if Pillar 1 were withdrawn?  Would that be a disaster? I think not.

Aukus was, at least in part, predicated on a joint commitment to prevent further military expansion of China, in particular an invasion of Taiwan.  The primary purpose of these submarines is to prevent a war, rather than be deployed in one. The nuclear submarine’s value is that it can go anywhere virtually undetected and remain underwater for extended periods of time.

I’m not a naval expert but it seems to me the major advantages of a nuclear submarine are in long range interdiction and surveillance. This is a strategic capability, not a tactical one.

Australia’s only strategic contribution to the containment of China comes in two parts.  Firstly, the very fact of us being in the alliance. And secondly, our geographic location as a base of operations. Our substantive military contribution to the alliance comes at the tactical level, as it did in South Vietnam.

Since the first world war, Australia has maintained a requirement that, at the tactical level, Australian forces should come under Australian command. We should continue to insist on that. But strategic assets, such as nuclear submarines or long-range bombers/missiles, will always be controlled by higher command. Certainly, there will be an Australian element in the higher command structure but, overall, the US will be calling the shots.

Why, then, would we want to pay for a very small portion of the strategic capability in peacetime, when it may well be removed from our control in the event of war?  HMAS Morrison may be captained and crewed by Australians, but if it is required for its strategic purposes, it will be deployed under US command. I cannot think of an argument that anyone could put to President Trump that would convince him we could use this scarce resource more effectively than the US.

Why not, then, cede this capability to the US and offer them facilities that would allow them to operate their nuclear subs out of our ports? The strategic capability will still exist, and it will benefit us no less than if a small part of it was, at inordinate cost, in our hands.

We could then devote our Defence budget to developing the tactical capability, in all three services, that we will need if we are really determined to be a useful Defence partner and not a freeloader. Certainly, nuclear submarines can provide valuable tactical support to a surface fleet – but so can conventional subs. I do not assert that we must have submarines – although, in the interest of a balanced tactical naval capability, I am inclined to think we do. As to suggestions that nuclear subs render conventional subs obsolete, I will simply observe that Japan operates a fleet of 23 diesel-electric conventional submarines, including its very latest Tagei class. These latest offer improved and quieter power plant operation (including Air Independent Propulsion) and the use of lithium-ion, rather than lead acid, batteries. And they cost about $US500 million, as opposed to roughly ten times that much for the Virginia class.

When US Defense Secretary Hegseth demanded we increase our defence spending to 3.5 per cent of GDP, the response of our feckless Prime Minister was both insulting and typically disingenuous. His glib proposition, delivered with his usual insufferable air of smugness, that ‘we will decide what capability we need and how much we will pay for it’ ignores the fact that every nation will always want more military capability than it can pay for. So, the equation is, get the best capability you can for the dollars you can afford. This translates, universally, to defence budgets expressed as a percentage of GDP.

As an aside, we are beset by a chronic inability on the part of the Defence Department to spend what money it is allocated effectively. That is another story but, as a general rule, absent extraordinary circumstances, we should only make major acquisitions off the shelf and from the US. If we go seriously to war, as our equipment becomes depleted, the US will be our only source of replacement, and they will not be giving us bespoke versions.

It would be good if we had a nuclear submarine capability. But not at the expense of a balanced and formidable conventional force. One, for example, that would allow us to project credible power within our region, to counter the humiliations recently visited upon us by China.

I make no claims about the likelihood or circumstances of Australia needing to ward off invasion – I will say it cannot be ruled out – but we neglect the need for a formidable balanced conventional force at our peril.That does not mean we must have a complete arsenal of all offensive and defensive weaponry. We have the advantage – for the moment at least – of a great and powerful friend. We can safely leave strategic capability, such as B2 bombers and nuclear submarines, in the hands of the US. But we must be able to field tactical formations that are self-sufficient.

If, by some increasingly remote chance, the Virginia subs survive this review, our defence posture from both sides will be, ‘Don’t you worry about that. When the Aukus subs arrive, she’ll be right’. God help us! And if it doesn’t, I have argued it would not be a disaster. But would it be a good outcome? Only if the government seizes it as an opportunity to get serious about defence.  With ‘Handsome Boy’ at the helm, the chances of that are vanishingly small.

Australia buying a couple of nuclear submarines is a bit like parking your Lamborghini under the carport in front of your fibro-cement bungalow in Dandenong and expecting your neighbours to respect you.