In recent days in the Middle East, our good friend and long-time ally the United States requested that we send a warship to safeguard vessels transiting those troubled waters. We said no.

What sort of ally are we that when our major partner asks for help we don’t respond?

A disloyal one.

This is a request from our partner who we have asked for considerable help acquiring nuclear submarines. They said yes. They have now asked us to join their efforts. What sort of partner are we?

A foolish one.

The Middle East is beset with various groups trying to up the ante around the Gaza. They have been firing drones and occasionally missiles at ships, likely hoping to see the Israel conflict flare up further afield. Civilian vessels are starting to request protection as they transit the area. This takes a small fleet of armed and capable warships. Other civilian companies are starting to avoid the area. For example, the shipping company Maersk has announced a re-routing of its ships around Africa and the Cape of Good Hope, adding millions of dollars to its costs which will be passed on to its customers. It would be better if the area was afforded capable protection and the attacks were completely prevented.

The request from the US was promulgated widely. Britain, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the Seychelles, and Spain have joined the US. The Seychelles is a tiny patrol boat force, but they saw fit to join in. Australia, a medium force, said no – the excuse was we need to prioritise efforts in the Pacific.

Some critics, particularly Greg Sheridan in the Australian, have argued fiercely a strong reason we aren’t sending a warship to the Middle East is because of the risk of drone attacks, particularly from the Houthi rebel group aligned with Iran. These attacks have been plentiful and continuous. For example, on 26 December the US destroyer Laboon, and F/A-18 Super Hornets from the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group shot down 12 one-way attack drones, three anti-ship ballistic missiles, and two land-attack cruise missiles in the southern Red Sea. These were fired by the Houthis over ten hours.

Sheridan argues we won’t send a ship because we can’t defend ourselves against drones. He is right, but we could equip any warships bound for the Gulf on the way, with technology such as the Drake defence system that US Navy vessels have been using for around two years. Sadly, retrofitting ships on the way to a hot spot is nothing new for Australia. In the first Gulf war – when Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990 – we committed vessels to a coalition effort to expel Iraq. They were not equipped properly with anti-air systems, so the decision was made to send along an Army unit with shoulder-launched missiles.

To be honest, this sort of attitude is typical of Australia. We have rested on the Alliance with the United States since the second world war. It was the US that flew the only air defence of the Northern Territory for most of 1942. When the enemy arrived in the shape of four aircraft carriers and 188 planes the ten defending fighters were American as were almost all of the subsequent bomber operations from northern Australia.

After the second world war, we started relying on our ‘Pacific partner’ as the British Empire slowly wound down. We use American missiles, helicopters, tanks, and military aircraft. It was the US Navy who stepped up when our attempt to build Collins-class submarines failed spectacularly. It took a lot of work to make these six submarines effective for the Navy.

Australia does not do enough to defend itself. We seem to think defence is about providing jobs. It is nice if that can happen but that’s not what’s most important. The crucial point about acquiring defence platforms is whether they work. We do not keep up – hence the lack of drone defences. Probe further and you find lots more wrong with our acquisition programs: Hunter frigates that aren’t designed to meet our needs adequately; Air Force aircraft not arriving early enough or in the requisite quantity; and an Army steadily reducing in size and capability. We would do better if we simply concentrated on buying proven platforms from overseas. It would also lead to a more streamlined force that had sufficient assets ready to deploy when necessary – as in this case.

Alliances come at a cost. That is, you express your thanks for the help you got previously. And so you step forward when it comes to a fight, not duck and weave your way out of it.

Politically however this American request is for more than a ship, in two ways. First, one ship basically means three – we can’t leave the ship and personnel there forever; both need to be replaced routinely for repairs and maintenance. So, while one ship is on station, another is preparing, and when the first comes back it is replaced by the second, while the third is readying itself. This is nothing unusual for the RAN – the Service has rotated ships into trouble spots over the past 50 years. Then again, we have too many admirals, and not enough sailors – the Navy like the other two forces is not meeting its recruiting targets, with too much wokeness and not enough reality. Witness the present advertisement which features a friendly sailor helping out in disaster relief rather than warfighting.

The second part of the US request is about showing support. The US armed forces are massive, and they could fulfill the requirements of safeguarding the sea in the Middle East by themselves if they had to do so. What they are really after is ‘a flag in the ground’ beside them. This means that when confronted by enemy forces there is an obvious coalition of nations lining up against the potential aggressors, not Uncle Sam muscling his way into a situation. It’s a useful way of defusing accusations of American aggression.

Australia in this case has failed. We need to do better.

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