They are known as the ‘princelings’ in China. They are the children, grandchildren and descendants of the high-ranking and influential Chinese Communist party officials who fought the revolution that led to the defeat of the Nationalists and the creation of the People’s Republic.

In modern China they occupy many prominent positions in the party, the military and business, due in part to their ongoing influence and the cronyism that is a feature of the regime. China’s dynastic culture has not disappeared; it has morphed into a new form. Like princes in the courts of old, the ‘princelings’ form a loose network of the families that largely rule China, complete with the intrigue and manoeuvrings of all closed polities.

The most prominent of the ‘princelings’ is Xi Jinping, China’s current leader. Xi is the son of Xi Zhongxun, a communist revolutionary and senior offical in the regime. His father was purged on occasion, and as a consequence Xi was exiled as a teenager to rural Yanchuan County in central China during Mao’s cultural revolution. It was there that Xi joined the Communist party, beginning his relentless climb through the ranks to rule the regime.

As is the nature of all polities, there are ongoing internal struggles for power and influence, which Xi has transcended, seeing off potential rivals, especially another ‘princeling’ Bo Xilai who was removed from office and subsequently charged with corruption offences after a scandal involving the vice-mayor of Chongqing, Wang Lijun. Bo’s downfall opened a clear pathway for Xi to seize the leadership of the party.

Understanding the role of the ‘princelings’, of which Xi is the most prominent, is critical to a discussion about his removal of the Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang from his post last week. Qin, who had been handpicked by Xi for the post, had been in the job for just seven months before disappearing from public sight for a month and eventually being removed from office.

Qin was no ordinary Chinese apparatchik. A fourth-generation ‘princeling’, he rose through the ranks under Xi. He was promoted to the director-general of the information department of the ministry in 2011 after he finished his tenure as a minister of the Chinese embassy in the United Kingdom from 2010 to 2011. In 2014, he became the director-general of the protocol department of the ministry.

Qin was promoted to vice minister of the Foreign Ministry in 2018 and three years later became the Chinese ambassador to the United States. He arrived in the US in July, 2021 to take his post in Washington DC. It was in this role that he gained a reputation as one of the loudest ‘wolf warriors’ globally, aggressively promoting the CCP and denouncing any perceived criticisms of the regime.

Despite being a confidant of the Chinese leader, Qin was unceremoniously removed from his position without explanation. The last time Qin made a public appearance was on 25 June for meetings with the Russian, Vietnamese and Sri Lankan foreign ministers, according to media reports. On 11 July, the Chinese foreign ministry announced Qin would not attend an Association of Southeast Asian Nations meeting in Indonesia for health reasons. Qin was scheduled to visit Australia to participate in the China-Australia Foreign and Strategic Dialogue, which was postponed after he disappeared.

Rumours about the fate of Qin had swept the web for weeks. The most persistent was that Qin was having an affair with Fu Xiaotian, the high-profile Phoenix television reporter, who, along with her son, has also disappeared. Phoenix is a state-owned broadcaster with headquarters in Hong Kong and Shenzhen. Fu, who studied at Cambridge, is said to have links with the British intelligence.

Although the CCP has remained tight-lipped about the disappearance of Qin, an editorial appeared soon after in the central party school’s newspaper that appears to relate to the issue. The article was a commentary on a speech given by Xi Jinping more than a year ago in March 2022. Why it suddenly became a topic of interest is curious. The thrust of the article was that ‘young cadets must have the moral fibre and the skill-set fit for their positions’. In light of the rumours about the former foreign minister, was this the regime insisting on the acceptable manner in which to interpret Qin’s removal? Otherwise, the affair could be seen as a failing on the part of Xi who had fast-tracked Qin to high office. Given there is a ‘Xi thought’ on everything in China –  a set of the leader’s instructions about most aspects of life –  there can be no suggestion that he could make a mistake. The cult of Xi simply will not allow it. Hence Xi has stepped in to enforce his high standards, trumping any suggestion of failing by the leader. Otherwise, why the publication a year after it was delivered of a relatively unimportant speech and a commentary in the Study Times?

An affair with a television host is hardly the likely reason for the action. Qin may be a ‘princeling’ but he is also steeped in the regime’s foreign policy and security apparatus. He would be acutely aware of the risks of being disloyal and the primary determination of the CCP to protect its monopoly on power. It is incredible to imagine that a personal dalliance only was involved.

The more likely reason is that Qin, having observed the negative impact of Xi’s obsessive, ideological crusade, realised that the leader’s doctrinaire policies were doing a grave disservice to China’s future prosperity. Qin was an enigma: a ‘wolf warrior’ who seemingly enjoyed the ways of the West; who was comfortable in the diplomatic circles of London and Washington. There is a misguided view that Xi represents the worldview of the entire Chinese elite. Many are still wedded privately to Deng’s vision of opening-up – a course being opposed resolutely by Xi. I suspect that Qin’s real crime – just like Bo, Jack Ma and others in various ways – is to seriously doubt, even reject, Xi’s views. This is why Xi’s followers had to find a reason to condemn Qin.

We may never know the real reason for Qin’s dismissal. He may reappear without fanfare at some stage – or he may be charged with national security offences, although it is difficult to believe that someone so experienced in the security system would be careless about his activities. China’s message to the world is clear: this is our domestic business. Equally, its unrelenting propaganda is on display again – Xi is the resolute leader of an institutionally superior nation.