There is an old divide in Australian politics. Since the foundation of the two-party system those who prioritise Asia-Pacific engagement have been set against those favour traditional connections to the English-speaking world – once described by Paul Keating as people who wished to travel ‘back down the time tunnel to the future’.

Whilst the debate in part turns on constitutional monarchy, it also blurs into the question of Australia’s place in the Commonwealth of Nations. Yet framing the Commonwealth within this binary is as restrictive as it is false. A third way is possible, brought home by the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting taking place in neighbouring Samoa.

Positioning Australia within the rapidly growing Asia-Pacific region is not at odds with its Commonwealth membership. In fact, the organisation’s economic gravity has now shifted to the region. The largest economy is no longer the UK, but India, with Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore adding yet more density to its new centre. When trade is 21 per cent cheaper between members due to shared legal systems and a common language – colloquially known as the ‘Commonwealth Advantage’ – the bonds that unite these nations can be leveraged to strengthen regional connections. Here, the Commonwealth is not a hindrance but a boost to regional ties.

Nevertheless, for some, the Commonwealth’s economic potential is obscured by its history – what Keating termed the ‘cultural cringe’.

But discarding a ready-made network for the sake of its background is challenged by a counterfactual: what if it didn’t exist? Countries would surely band together to form an alliance of like-minded, English-speaking nations to leverage shared advantages for the benefit of member states.

If such an organisation were formed today, there is the question of what it would do. First, it would surely seek to increase trade between members, wherever they were located. While it’s natural for nations to focus on nearby markets for reasons of logistics, when English language and common law systems smooth trade friction between countries that share them, it is logical to also build on these benefits by lowering artificial barriers.

This need not interfere with membership in other trade blocs. There are many barriers that can be reduced while remaining consistent with existing agreements, such as Australia’s participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). It should not be an ‘either/or’ scenario, but rather a bolstering of complementary alliances.

Secondly, an alliance of English-speaking nations would undoubtedly seek to enhance its members’ geopolitical influence on the world stage and within intergovernmental forums. For small and mid-sized countries, it would represent an opportunity to strengthen their bargaining power. For larger members, it would enable them to project influence beyond their immediate region.

Many votes at forums such as the UN General Assembly may seem inconsequential to some but hold great significance to others. For members of an English-speaking alliance, their influence would be magnified if they were to caucus together and agree on common voting lines to support issues of interest to one, several, or multiple members. This approach could provide a pathway to greater collective weight in global decision-making.

Thirdly, with a shared language, legal systems, and trade relationships, matters of security inevitably arise. It would make sense to pair this with interoperability of weaponry and systems between members. As the world becomes more unstable and turbulent, strength in numbers becomes essential. But numbers are futile if members cannot operate together effectively.

An English-speaking alliance would surely leverage the collective resources of its more powerful members, such as Australia, to invest in infrastructure, economic, and development programmes in smaller, more vulnerable states to keep them free from malign influences that seek to undermine our way of life.

If this is the potential of a hypothetical organisation, then there’s no reason not to harness it with the one already at hand.

The Asia-Pacific will remain central to Australia, but opportunities further afield should not be overlooked – particularly in the markets of the English-speaking Commonwealth, whose combined GDP of AUD $16 trillion in 2017 is projected to nearly double to AUD $28 trillion by 2027.

In the decades following Federation, Australia itself was not powerful enough to develop or project influence beyond its region, or even within it. Today, the Commonwealth provides many of its smaller members – including many across Asia and the South Pacific – with the same international network from which Australia once benefited. The natural progression to Commonwealth members organising and increasingly voting together at international forums such as the United Nations has only just begun, having, surprisingly, only been officialised in the last few years.

The next logical step, which has yet to be realised, is for leading Commonwealth states such as Australia and, yes, Britain to invest more collaboratively and substantially in smaller member countries. If they do not, it is inevitable that these nations will be tempted to seek resources from other countries, such as China, which may have less benevolent intentions.

The Commonwealth exists today with untapped economic and geopolitical potential. Today, Keating’s choice of Asia Pacific over the Commonwealth is a binary Australia does not need to make. The two are not mutually exclusive. Australia can have both. For the sake of a name, if the Commonwealth didn’t exist, we would create it. Australia should nurture this invaluable network of opportunity, investing more, not less, in its future.