Warfare in the 21st Century is often conducted in the realm of cyberspace.

Despite the growing concerns of cybercrime and digitised infrastructure, the World Economic Forum is still encouraging a Digital ID system.

It has now reached Australia’s coastal doorstep.

The Digital ID Bill 2023 was tabled in Parliament on November 30 leaving vigilant citizens across the nation seriously concerned.

‘Digital ID’, in short, refers to the economy of private information that will be uploaded, held, and used by various institutions (both domestic and foreign) to supposedly create greater ‘efficiency’ in a rapidly developing world.

It is touted as the next ‘big development’ in the Build Back Better community of Great Reset promoters.

With any new technological development, central to its use should be a critical analysis of the ramifications of this framework. This is especially true with Digital ID given it is inherently fraught with privacy issues and national security concerns. Section 160 of the Bill is frankly worrying. It is poorly drafted and demonstrates little concern over Australia’s national security as it limits civil penalties for those who contravene a civil penalty provision of the Act if the conduct occurs wholly in a foreign country.

It is important to ask who is behind the proposal, what sort of data will be stored in the infrastructure, how secure will it be, and ultimately what happens with all the data…

The Bill is being promoted by the Labor Party.

It is also worth asking what the legal ramifications are. How does the Digital ID system fit with existing Privacy Laws and human rights legislation? Is it compatible with the notion of a truly democratic and free society, or will it set the stage up for further surveillance and government encroachment on civilian life?

Section 79 of the Digital ID exposure draft protects entities participating in the Digital ID system from liability. It is broad and negligently drafted, which shows the government’s lax disregard for privacy concerns and protections.

The draft of the Bill also outlines what kinds of data can be collected if passed into law. The scope of the data in question is enormous – and it includes biometrics.

Biometric data within the Bill is defined as the following: ‘Biometric information means information about any measurable biological characteristic relating to an individual that could be used to identify the individual.’ An accredited entity may collect this data from citizens and disclose it, with consent, they say. If certain fundamental services are withheld from individuals unless they consent to a Digital ID, this ‘protective’ provision is rendered completely useless.

The contents page of the Bill should be enough to raise the alarm about potential issues with the infrastructure – there are monetary penalties for those who misuse data for marketing purposes. This indicates that a digitised identity, along with personal data, can be hacked and used for malevolent activities.

Imagine if a hostile foreign regime got their hands on data through the conduit of an accredited entity that has access to private information. There are allegations and suspicions that several of Australia’s institutions may already by compromised, but imagine how much worse it would be if the data was centralised and extensive.

One of the objectives of the Bill, according to the first ‘provision’ in the exposure draft, is to verify the identity of individuals in online transactions concerning the government and businesses. The first problem with this method is that it will inherently require data to be collected by public or private entities. Not all private businesses within Australia are Australian-owned, or sufficiently secure.

The second objective of the Bill is to promote the advancement of trust in Digital ID services, which indicates an existing lack of trust within the community.

Arguably there is distrust as there are issues with allowing businesses and entities access to personal data they normally would not have access to.

The Digital ID framework itself means digital transactions will be surveilled even more heavily than they currently are. A society of 1984-style surveillance paves the way towards a social credit system.

The Bill includes objectives indicating the system is ‘voluntary’.

‘Voluntary’ in this context really means ‘coercive’. The Bill itself tells you in the ‘objects’ section that it wishes to facilitate the advancement of Digital IDs. How do you do that and simultaneously make the function truly voluntary?

Section 71 of the Bill indicates that the system is ‘voluntary’ (subsection 1) however, if a service related to the primary service requires the engagement of the Digital ID, then entities can easily coerce its use. This would enable companies to coerce digital IDs through the semblance of ‘choice’.

The Digital ID Bill contains some drafting which attempts to safeguard citizen privacy, however, the reality of the situation is that a citizen may not know whether an entity has disclosed confidential information to a relying third party, in order to use the legislation to sue an entity in breach.

If you do discover a breach, the Bill provides ample protection from liability through vague and broad drafting, particularly at section 79 – making privacy concerns wishful thinking.

The Digital ID Bill and developments should be opposed for the reasons above – it will open the floodgates towards greater surveillance, foreign interference, and data breaches, and allow entities such as the World Economic Forum to further promote centralised digital infrastructure which can lead to serious privacy concerns down the track, or threaten the nation’s sovereignty. Australian citizen information should not be centralised in infrastructure that concomitantly reduces civil or criminal liability from Digital ID-promoting entities.

Australia should focus on strengthening existing security and privacy frameworks and work on models that eliminate corruption, and allow for ample accountability mechanisms, instead.

It may be wise to reject the Digital ID and see the infrastructure for what it is: another globalist Trojan horse that will likely threaten Australia’s sovereignty and independence in the long term.