After the 2016 presidential elections, it became obvious that the US mainstream media had abandoned its vocation of being both free and responsible, to being the propaganda arm of a Democratic party captured by the far Left.

Exceptions apart, let us hope that Australia’s mainstream media never stoop to this.  Sadly, a mass deviation from the standards of the free and responsible media occurred in 1999. (This was just after my ten years as Press Council chairman.)

As the distinguished British editor, Lord Deedes, wrote in the London Telegraph, he had never seen the media of a democratic country display ‘more shameless bias’ during a national vote. They were ‘determined…that Australians should have a republic’ and ‘used every device towards that end’.

This was despite the fact that the winning ACM No case was managed not by nostalgic royalists, but by strong constitutionalists. Their core objections were the destruction of the crucial reserve powers and the politicisation of the constitutional head. (As in the  latest ARM model). Yet, the media gave overwhelming support to the seriously deficient  1999 politicians’ republic.

Sadly, this was not the last time the mainstream media would ally themselves with the political class rather than doing their duty.

When governments came close to imposing a dictatorship during the pandemic, the mainstream media went along with that using the all-purpose mantra that ‘this was the right thing to do’.

Rather than being the right thing, this breached a collection of basic freedoms in place even before we federated, surely as implied  in our constitution as much as the fHigh Court acknowledges freedom of political speech.

The danger is that the excesses we saw then are likely to be repeated if Beijing develops new viruses in their preparation for biological warfare. Presumably, with his announced retirement, Anthony Fauci will fortunately be unable to fund any more unconscionable ‘gain-of-function’ research.

The constitutional outrage which occurred during the pandemic must never be repeated. Asked my views  by a senior federal government advisor on the value of having a royal commission on this, I replied: ‘It all depends on whom you appoint.’

A weak royal commission would be worse than no royal commission. The preferably several royal commissioners should offer different qualities, styles and importantly, public profiles. The first names to come to me were former High Court judges Ian Callinan and Michael Kirby, Margaret Cunneen SC, and former NSW Labor A-G  John Hatzistergos.

Unless the government is strong, there will be no royal commission. Politicians from all sides would come out badly.

So although the politicians have whittled down the role of executive councils, governors-general and governors, as well as the disallowance power of upper houses, it is important that we recognise the crucial vice-regal role in our system of governance, including the reserve powers where governors-general act without ministerial advice.

On this I recently interviewed for the new media platform, ADH.TV, Vietnam veteran Peter O’Brien on his book, Villain or Victim, A Defence of Sir John Kerr and the Reserve Powers, published  by Connor Court.

A considered response to Paul Kelly and Troy Bramston’s The Dismissal, O’Brien’s is the best study for those who want to understand both the reserve powers and the role of Sir John Kerr.

We should not forget that Sir John was Whitlam’s choice as governor-general. On this Sir Paul Hasluck observed that from remarks Whitlam made to him about Kerr when he was recommending his appointment, Whitlam certainly had a poor opinion of Kerr. While Hasluck says he did not know whether Whitlam did this because he assumed Kerr would be his puppet, Peter O’Brien asks what an earth would Whitlam be doing choosing as governor-general someone of whom he had a very low opinion, unless ‘setting him up as a puppet was exactly his intention’.

O’Brien was disappointed in Kelly and Bramston’s book, which he says leaves no stone unturned to paint the most unflattering portrait. Either Kerr is a ‘pompous self-seeking sycophant’ revelling in the trappings of high office or a ‘scheming Machiavellian figure’ who puts all at risk for the dubious pleasure of making his mark by dismissing a duly elected government. O’Brien’s aim, above all, is to rehabilitate the status of the reserve powers which he says are not an anachronism. They remain an important feature of our system of government.

O’Brien argues that once we step away from various peripheral issues that clutter the debate, only one substantive criticism can be made of Kerr – not warning Whitlam he risked dismissal.

But if Whitlam had been warned, there is little doubt that he would have advised the Queen to dismiss Kerr. Or, as Gough later told me, recommend a fresh appointment.

It seems clear that the overriding reason Kerr did not warn Whitlam was his determination not to involve the Queen in something for which she was not responsible. Kerr went to great lengths to protect the Queen.

The other reason was there was no need for a warning.

Whitlam knew full well what he should do, as well as the risks involved. He just did not think that Kerr had the courage to do his duty. Whitlam misjudged the character of the man, foisting on him an invalid Executive Council meeting held, it seems deliberately so, in his absence to approve the notorious Loans Affair.

Whitlam was a highly qualified lawyer, a Queen’s Counsel. He fully understood the constitutional situation. Indeed, on 12 June  1970 as opposition leader, he lectured the House on the consequences of the Senate blocking a money bill. The government had to resign. He had tabled in the Senate a list of Labor’s previous 169 attempts since 1950 to do what Fraser did twice.

Gough Whitlam needed no warning of the consequences of rejecting supply. His problem was that he assumed Kerr was too weak to do his duty.

There can be no doubt. The reserve powers exist and are an important part of our constitutional system. And Sir John Kerr did his duty.